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INFO ALL EC CAPITALS
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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: FR
SUBJECT: THE EXPANDING CIRCLES OF FRENCH FOREIGN
POLICY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US

REF: (A) PARIS 17181, (B) PARIS 20723, (C) PARIS 20055

1. SUMMARY: GISCARD'S LONG-HEADED EMPHASIS ON FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY -- GIVEN NEW THRUST SINCE THE MARCH ELECTIONS, WITH THE RESULTANT PROSPECT THAT GISCARD MAY BE IN OFFICE ANOTHER TEN YEARS -- REVEALS INCREASINGLY A NEW PATTERN. IN THE FIRST "CIRCLE" OF GISCARDIAN INTERESTS -- WESTERN EUROPE -- GISCARD SEES A GROWING ROLE FOR FRANCE AS A PIVOT BETWEEN THE EC'S AGRARIAN SOUTH AND ITS INDUSTRIAL NORTH AND AS AN INCREASINGLY CONFIDENT COMPETITOR WITH THE STRONGER EUROPEAN ECONOMIES. GISCARD'S APPROACH TO WEST EUROPE IS HIS TOP PRIORITY, BUT THE EXACT DIRECTION OF HIS POLICY HAS YET TO EMERGE; THE COURSE OF THE SCHMIDT-GISCARD MONETARY INITIATIVE WILL PROVIDE AN IMPORTANT INDICATION. GISCARD'S LONG-RANGE PLANS FOR EUROPE IMPLY SOME DISTANCING FROM THE US ON SPECIFIC ISSUES, BUT WE BELIEVE GISCARD WILL TRY TO MINIMIZE MAJOR DIVERGENCES. THE SECOND CIRCLE OF FRENCH INTERESTS -- THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP -- IS THE MOST STAGNANT TODAY. FRENCH ACTIONS AND ATTITUDES IN AFRICA AND ON HUMAN RIGHTS HAVE CAUSED A RIFT IN FRENCH RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW WHICH GISCARD SEEMS PREPARED TO ACCEPT, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY. BUT LIKE HIS PREDECESSORS HE WILL CONTINUE TO SEE GOOD RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW AS BALANCING RELATIONS WITH THE US.

THE THIRD CIRCLE OF FRENCH INTERESTS -- THE DEVELOPING WORLD -- IS THE FOCUS OF MAJOR FRENCH INITIATIVES. AN
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EFFORT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE DEVELOPING WORLD -- TO HARNESS AND LEAD THE POLITICAL FORCE OF THE THIRD WORLD NATIONS -- IS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR BOTH IN GISCARD'S RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE UN AND IN HIS BRINGING FRANCE BACK INTO THE DISARMAMENT GAME. ANOTHER FACTOR IS GISCARD'S DESIRE TO ENSURE FRANCE'S PARTICIPATION IN ALL THE MAJOR ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY. INCREASED FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN THE UN AND IN DISARMAMENT AND MIDDLE EAST PEACEKEEPING IS IN THE US INTEREST, THOUGH WE WILL HAVE SOME MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH SPECIFIC FRENCH ATTITUDES. IN ADDITION TO DISARMAMENT, PEACEKEEPING, AND THE UN, A THIRD FACET OF GISCARD'S APPROACH TO THE DEVELOPING WORLD IS HIS AFRICAN POLICY, WHICH CRISES IN THE WESTERN SAHARA, CHAD, AND ZAIRE HAVE EXPOSED AS HIGHLY ACTIVIST, BASED ON AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SOVIET-CUBAN THREAT, AND LESS INCLINED THAN THE US TO PRESS FOR REFORM OR CHANGE. AT THE SAME TIME GISCARD HAS A STRONG INTEREST IN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT AND IS NO DEFENDER OF THE STATUS QUO. AFRICA POSES A MAJOR PROBLEM FOR THE RECONCILIATION OF FRENCH AND US POLICIES, BUT WE BELIEVE FRENCH AND AMERICAN INTERESTS IN AFRICA ARE COMPATIBLE AND COMPLEMENTARY. END SUMMARY.

2. BEFORE THE MARCH ELECTIONS, FOREIGN POLICY WAS ON GISCARD'S BACK BURNER. IT'S ON THE FRONT BURNER NOW. IN A TWO-WEEK PERIOD A MONTH AGO, GISCARD WORKED ROUND THE CLOCK ON THE SHABA CRISIS, RECEIVED THE PRESIDENT OF SENEGAL ON AN OFFICIAL VISIT, HOSTED AN AFRICAN SUMMIT MEETING, DELIVERED A DISARMAMENT SPEECH AT THE UN, CONFERRED WITH PRESIDENT CARTER IN WASHINGTON, AND RECEIVED THE KING OF SAUDI ARABIA BACK IN PARIS. SINCE THEN HE HAS SEEN SCHMIDT IN BONN AND THE LIBYAN PRIME MINISTER

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IN PARIS, AND HAS BEEN IN SPAIN ON A STATE VISIT. IN ALL THIS FLURRY OF ACTIVITY, NEW EMPHASES IN FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY ARE BEGINNING TO EMERGE. WHILE SEVERAL LINES OF CURRENT POLICY HAVE BEEN VISIBLE FOR SOME TIME AND WHILE THE OVERALL CONTEXT HAS NOT CHANGED, TAKEN AS A WHOLE FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY IS ASSUMING A NEW SHAPE.

3. THE CONTEXT OF FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY HAS CHANGED IN DEGREE BUT NOT IN KIND SINCE DE GAULLE. THE "FIRST CIRCLE" OF IMPORTANCE REMAINS FRANCE'S ROLE IN A WESTERN EUROPE WHICH SHOULD BE "CONFEDERAL" AND IN WHICH WEST GERMANY SHOULD BE BOUND BOTH TO FRANCE AND TO THE MULTILATERAL EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS. GISCARD SEES FRANCE'S ROLE IN EUROPE AS AN EXPANDING ONE. IN SPAIN HE EMPHASIZED FRANCE'S DUAL ORIENTATION: MEDITERRANEAN AND ATLANTIC. EC ENLARGEMENT, BY TAKING IN THREE SOUTHERN COUNTRIES, COULD GIVE FRANCE THE OPPORTUNITY TO PLAY A PIVOTAL ROLE BETWEEN EUROPE'S INDUSTRIAL NORTH AND ITS AGRARIAN SOUTH. GISCARD HAS ALSO SHOWN CONCERN TO MAKE FRANCE A BETTER COMPETITOR WITH THE STRONGER ECONOMIES OF NORTHERN EUROPE; BARRE'S ECONOMIC POLICIES ARE IN PART DIRECTED TO THAT END. GISCARD'S COLLABORATION WITH SCHMIDT IN TRYING TO ENHANCE EUROPEAN MONETARY STABILITY AND COOPERATION, WITH FRANCE AS A MAJOR PARTICIPANT, IS A KEY ASPECT OF HIS EUROPEAN POLICY. AS WITH OTHER ASPECTS OF HIS NEW EMPHASIS ON EUROPE, IT IS STILL IN A PRELIMINARY STAGE. WE WILL HAVE TO AWAIT EVENTS BEFORE WE CAN BE SURE OF THE DIRECTION IN WHICH GISCARD IS HEADING.

4. WHAT DOES SEEM CLEAR IS THAT GISCARD SEES HIS EUROPEAN POLICY AS THE AREA WHERE HE WOULD LIKE TO SET HIS STRONGEST FOREIGN POLICY STAMP. HE HIMSELF HAS INDICATED THAT, IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE MARCH ELECTIONS, HE WOULD BE PAYING MORE ATTENTION TO EUROPE; THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF AT THE ELYSEE HAS CONFIRMED TO US THAT

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CATED THAT, IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE MARCH ELECTIONS, HE WOULD BE PAYING MORE ATTENTION TO EUROPE; THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF AT THE ELYSEE HAS CONFIRMED TO US THAT

THIS IS HIS FIRST PRIORITY. HE IS LIKELY TO PROCEED AT A MEASURED PACE, ASSUMING THAT HE HAS TEN MORE YEARS AS PRESIDENT; NONETHELESS, WE EXPECT HIM TO COME UP WITH SOME NEW INITIATIVES FOR THE FRENCH EC PRESIDENCY PERIOD BEGINNING NEXT JANUARY. WE THINK, AS ONE OF HIS AIDES SAID TO US, THAT GISCARD'S EUROPEAN DESIGN IMPLIES A "CERTAIN DISTANCING" FROM THE UNITED STATES ON SPECIFIC ISSUES (E.G., CONTINUING AND PERHAPS INCREASED DIFFICULTIES IN NATO AND OVER CSCE, HEIGHTENED PROBLEMS OVER SALT AND SALT III NEGOTIATIONS WHICH IMPINGE MORE DIRECTLY ON FRENCH INTERESTS). ECONOMIC ISSUES IN PARTICULAR CARRY SOME SEEDS OF DISPUTE, E.G., THE MONETARY ISSUE, THE FRENCH DESIRE TO PENETRATE MORE MARKETS FOR THEIR AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS, GROWING FRENCH COMPETITION IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY AREAS (LIKE AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURE). WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT GISCARD WILL NOT SEEK CONFRONTATION WITH US; ANY BILATERAL PROBLEMS WILL BE THE RESULT OF REAL, NOT FABRICATED, DIFFICULTIES. AND WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT GISCARD WILL DO HIS BEST TO TREAT SUCH PROBLEMS IN THE CONTEXT OF A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US, A RELATIONSHIP IN WHICH HE BELIEVES OUR BASIC INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES TO BE COMPATIBLE.

5. A SECOND CIRCLE OF FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY IS THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP. GISCARD ACCEPTS THE GAULLIST THESIS THAT FRANCE HAS A SPECIAL ROLE BETWEEN THE TWO SUPER-POWERS. HIS TILT TOWARD THE US POLE IS FAR MORE PRONOUNCED THAN THAT OF HIS PREDECESSORS, AND -- MOST RECENTLY -- HIS AFRICAN POLICY HAS REFLECTED A WILLINGNESS TO PICK UP FROM THE UNITED STATES SOME OF THE ROLE OF DEFENDER OF WESTERN INTERESTS. BUT THE ELEMENT OF "BALANCE" IN FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY REMAINS ESSENTIAL, CONFIDENTIAL

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FROM THE FRENCH VIEWPOINT, IF FRANCE IS TO PROJECT AN INDEPENDENT WORLD IMAGE.

6. GISCARD'S FORWARD STRATEGY IN AFRICA -- PLUS FRENCH MISGIVINGS ON HUMAN RIGHTS -- ARE ALREADY HAVING A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON FRENCH-SOVIET RELATIONS (REFTEL A). THIS DOES NOT APPEAR TO DISTURB GISCARD; IN FACT, HE SEEMS PREPARED TO LET HIS BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MOSCOW COOL OFF FOR THE TIME BEING. HE IS ALSO WILLING TO FLASH THE CHINA CARD A BIT MORE OSTENTATIOUSLY. THERE IS GREAT FRENCH INTEREST IN A MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRC, CONFIRMED BY SEVERAL RECENT CHINESE MILITARY VISITS AND BY A POSITIVE PUBLIC FRENCH GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE ON THE ISSUE AT A RECENT WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION MEETING. A VISIT TO FRANCE BY HUA

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KUO-FENG OR TENG HSAIO-PING IS EXPECTED. THE FRENCH ARE ALSO TRYING TO REINSURE VIA A CONCERTED EFFORT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES; RECENT WEEKS HAVE BEEN PEPPERED BY HIGH-LEVEL FOREIGN OFFICE VISITS BACK AND FORTH (REFTEL B). THE QUAI TELLS US THAT FRANCO-SOVIET RELATIONS ARE NOT AS BAD AS THEY SEEM. IN ANY CASE, WE DOUBT THAT EITHER PARIS OR MOSCOW WILL BE DISPOSED TO LET RELATIONS SLIP TOO FAR OR THAT THE US WILL BE A DIRECT GAINER FROM THE RIFT.

7. BEYOND EUROPE, THE THIRD CIRCLE OF GISCARD'S POLICY INVOLVES RELATIONS WITH THE DEVELOPING WORLD, A POLICY PRIORITY WHICH BEGAN WITH DE GAULLE'S DIVESTMENT OF FRANCE'S COLONIAL EMPIRE. FRANCE'S MIDDLE POSITION -- AS A MAJOR EUROPEAN POWER BUT NOT A SUPER-POWER -- HAS GIVEN IT A VOCATION IN THE THIRD WORLD WHICH IT HAS SOUGHT TO EXPLOIT THROUGH EMPHASIS ON ITS CULTURAL/IDEOLOGICAL APPEAL, ON ITS HISTORICAL TIES, AND ON ITS ECONOMIC ATTRACTION. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GISCARD'S POLICY TOWARD THE UN, TOWARD DISARMAMENT, MIDDLE EAST, AND TOWARD AFRICA NEED TO BE SEEN -- AT LEAST IN PART-- IN THE LIGHT OF THE OVERALL FRENCH APPROACH TO THE DEVELOPING WORLD. GISCARD'S APPROACH IS A LOGICAL CONTINUATION OF GAULLISM, BUT IT OPENS DOORS WHICH DE GAULLE WAS CONTENT TO KEEP CLOSED. DE GAULLE'S SCORN OF THE UN AND HIS BOYCOTT OF THE CCD BOTH INVOLVED A REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE INFLUENCE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. (HIS DISLIKE OF THE SOVIET-US CO-CHAIRMANSHIP WAS AN ADDITIONAL ELEMENT WITH THE CCD.) GISCARD HOPES TO CHANNEL AND HARNESS THE POLITICAL IMPETUS OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, AND TO ESTABLISH FRANCE AS THEIR LEADER IN THE WEST; THIS HAS IN LARGE MEASURE DRAWN HIM CLOSER TO THE UN AND TO DISARMAMENT FORUMS.

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8. GISCARD IS PUTTING MUCH MORE EMPHASIS ON THE UN THAN EITHER DE GAULLE OR POMPIDOU DID. INDEED HIS NEW APPROACH TO THE UN AMOUNTS TO A MAJOR TURN IN FRENCH POLICY. HE CHOSE TO COME IN PERSON TO PRESENT HIS DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS -- A SYMBOLICALLY IMPORTANT BREAK WITH TRADITION. THE PROPOSALS THEMSELVES ENVISAGE A GREATER ROLE FOR THE UN THAN FRENCH PRESIDENTS HAVE ASSIGNED TO IT IN THE PAST. IN THE FRENCH IDEAS (WATERED DOWN DURING THE SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT), THE UN WOULD BE THE PARENT ORGANIZATION FOR THE SATELLITE VERIFICATION AGENCY, AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

WOULD HAVE A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP TO THE SUCCESSOR ORGANIZATION TO THE CCD. MORE IMPORTANT, GISCARD HAS COMMITTED FRENCH TROOPS TO THE UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN LEBANON (THOUGH THE FRENCH ARE HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT KEEPING THEM THERE). THERE ARE VARIOUS SPECIFIC REASONS FOR THESE PARTICULAR INITIATIVES (IN PARTICULAR THE UNIFIL INITIATIVE ILLUSTRATES THE MAJOR IMPORTANCE GISCARD ATTACHES TO THE MIDDLE EAST). AT THE HEART OF THEM ALL IS A GISCARDIAN DESIRE TO GIVE MORE POLICY WEIGHT TO AN INSTITUTION HELD IN GREAT IMPORTANCE BY THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES AS WELL AS A FEELING THAT FRANCE SHOULD HAVE A VOICE IN ALL MAJOR AREAS OF INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF UN ACTIVITIES -- NORTH/SOUTH OVERVIEW, COMMON FUND, ILLICIT PAYMENTS, ETC. -- WILL ALSO REFLECT THIS DESIRE ACTIVELY TO DEAL WITH LDC'S IN A MILIEU WHICH THEY PREFER.

9. THE FRENCH DISARMAMENT INITIATIVE ITSELF REPRESENTS A BREAK WITH PREVIOUS FRENCH POLICY. TO SOME DEGREE IT WAS INEVITABLE THAT FRANCE SHOULD SEEK TO INVOLVE ITSELF IN AN INTERNATIONAL ARENA WHICH WAS GAINING IN SCOPE AND IMPORTANCE AND WAS INCREASINGLY AFFECTING FRENCH INTERESTS. ADDITIONAL FRENCH MOTIVES FOR BREAK-

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ING THE DISARMAMENT ISOLATION WERE UNDOUBTEDLY MIXED: TO WIN SUPPORT FROM THE THIRD WORLD (SATELLITE VERIFICATION AGENCY, OVER-ARMAMENT TAX), TO FIND A FACE-SAVING WAY TO GET FRANCE INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS NOW HANDLED IN THE CCD, TO SHIFT THE FOCUS OF EUROPEAN CONVENTIONAL ARMS NEGOTIATIONS FROM MBFR TO A MORE CAPACIOUS CSCE-SIZE ORGANIZATION IN WHICH FRANCE COULD PLAY AN INDEPENDENT ROLE. WHILE MUCH FRENCH THINKING ON DISARMAMENT IS STILL IN A PRELIMINARY STAGE, IT IS ALREADY CLEAR THAT EMERGING FRENCH POLICIES WILL BE FLAVORED BY A THIRD WORLD ORIENTATION AND AN EFFORT TO REDUCE THE RELATIVE ROLE OF BLOCS AND OF THE TWO SUPER-POWERS. AT THE SSOD THE FRENCH SHOWED SOME DISPOSITION TO COMPROMISE THE MORE EXTREME AND

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UNREALISTIC ASPECTS OF THEIR POSITIONS. NO DOUBT WE
WILL HAVE CONTINUING PROBLEMS WITH THEM ON DISARMAMENT
ISSUES. BUT IT IS WORTHWHILE TO HAVE THEM IN THE GAME,
AND THEY HAVE SHOWN THEMSELVES SUSCEPTIBLE TO REASON-
ABLE US LOBBYING (AS FOR EXAMPLE ON THE PAKISTAN RE-
PROCESSING ISSUE).

10. FINALLY, GISCARD'S AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT IS THE MOST STRIKING ASPECT OF FRENCH POLICY TOWARD THE DEVELOPING WORLD. IT IS ALSO THE MOST REACTIVE ASPECT. IN AFRICA THE FRENCH HAVE FELT THEMSELVES FORCED TO RESPOND TO CRISES -- IN THE WESTERN SAHARA, IN CHAD, AND IN ZAIRE. THEY SEE THEIR INTERESTS IN TERMS OF A LARGE ECONOMIC STAKE, A HISTORIC LEGACY OF INFLUENCE, A COMMITMENT (AS IN CHAD) TO THE DEFENSE OF FORMER COLONIES, AND A DESIRE TO PRESERVE A BALANCE AGAINST EXTREME SOLUTIONS FAVORED BY THE SOVIETS, CUBANS, LIBYANS, OR ALGERIANS. FRANCE IS TODAY SECOND TO CUBA AS THE NON-AFRICAN COUNTRY WITH THE MOST TROOPS IN AFRICA. IT IS ALSO A MAJOR AID DONOR AND A WOULD-BE CATALYST FOR THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF OTHERS (E.G., THROUGH GISCARD'S AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT PROPOSAL). GISCARD CLEARLY FEELS OVER-EXPOSED MILITARILY IN AFRICA; THERE HAS BEEN RISING OPPOSITION IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FROM ALL THE MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES BUT HIS OWN. HIS SUPPORT FOR AN INTER-AFRICAN FORCE, HIS FRAGILE AGREEMENT WITH LIBYAN PRIME MINISTER JALLOUD ON A CEASE-FIRE IN CHAD, AND HIS ATTEMPTS AT A RAPPROCHEMENT WITH ALGERIA ARE ALL ASPECTS OF THIS CONCERN.

11. IN OUR VIEW US AND FRENCH INTERESTS IN AFRICA ARE COMPATIBLE AND COMPLEMENTARY, THOUGH NOT IDENTICAL. REFTEL C DISCUSSES FRENCH POLICY IN DETAIL. TO SUMMARIZE, GISCARD IS SERIOUS ABOUT "AFRICA FOR THE AFRICANS,"
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BUT BELIEVES THAT THE WEST MUST HELP AFRICAN STATES DEFEND THEMSELVES. HE PUTS HIS MAIN EMPHASIS ON STABILITY AS A NECESSARY BASIS FOR DEVELOPMENT AND AS A WAY TO LESSEN SOVIET AND CUBAN INFLUENCE. OVER THE LONGER RUN HE WOULD HOPE STABILITY COULD BE ASSURED WITHOUT DIRECT FRENCH INVOLVEMENT, THROUGH TRAINING AFRICAN TROOPS AND FOSTERING AFRICAN REGIONAL DEFENSE EFFORTS. THE STABILITY FACTOR, PLUS THE FACT THAT FRANCE'S HISTORIC TIES IN AFRICA PUT IT CLOSER TO THE FRANCOPHONE "MODERATES" THAN TO THE ANGLOPHONE "PROGRESSIVES," MAKES GISCARD SOMEWHAT LESS INCLINED THAN WE TO PRESS FOR CHANGE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA OR TO REACT TO CHARGES OF NEOCOLONIALISM OR IMPERIALISM. NEVERTHELESS, HE RECOGNIZES THE PITFALLS OF THE STATUS QUO -- THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN HELPFUL IF NOT ALWAYS ENTHUSIASTIC PARTNERS IN DESIGNING WESTERN STRATEGIES TO DEAL WITH SOUTHERN AFRICA AND HAVE JOINED WITH US IN URGING REFORMS ON MOBUTU. GISCARD ALSO DESIRES NOT TO BE DRAWN INTO AFRICA'S IDEOLOGICAL SQUABBLES -- HE IS INCREASINGLY ANXIOUS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH NETO AND ENCOURAGES NORMAL RELATIONS WITH MENGISTU.

12. FOR THE US TO DISTRUST FRENCH MOTIVES IN AFRICA WOULD BE, IN OUR VIEW, A MISTAKE. THERE ARE OBVIOUS SELF-SERVING ASPECTS TO THEIR MILITARY INTERVENTIONS AND TO THE GISCARD PROPOSAL ON AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT. BUT THERE IS ALSO SOMETHING TO THEIR BELIEF THAT, IN THE SECURITY AREA, THEY ARE DOING WHAT THE US CAN NO LONGER DO TO STEM SOVIET/CUBAN ADVANCES AND THAT, IN DEVELOPMENT, THEIR EXPERIENCE GIVES THEM A MAJOR ROLE TO PLAY. IT SHOULD ALSO BE ENCOURAGING, FROM A US POINT OF VIEW, THAT A WESTERN ALLY LIKE FRANCE IS PREPARED TO TAKE INITIATIVES OF ITS OWN RATHER THAN LEAVING THEM TO US. OUR PROBLEMS WITH FRANCE IN AFRICA ARE -- OR SHOULD BE -- PROBLEMS OF EMPHASIS AND TACTICS, NOT OF OVERALL OBJECTIVES. WE WILL NEED TO CONVINCE THE FRENCH OF OUR CONFIDENTIAL

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REASONS FOR PUTTING PRIMARY EMPHASIS ON OUR RELATIONS WITH THE FRONT LINE STATES AND ON OUR SOUTHERN AFRICAN POLICY. THEY WILL TRY TO CONVINCE US OF THE VALUE OF THEIR APPROACH TO STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA. A ROUGH MUTUALITY OF ATTITUDE IS DESIRABLE AND, WE BELIEVE, OBTAINABLE.
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Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 07 jul 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
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SAS ID: 2087049
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: THE EXPANDING CIRCLES OF FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US
TAGS: PINR, PEPR, PGOV, FR
To: STATE
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Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014